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Abstract. In this paper we propose the concept of an inverted cloud
infrastructure. The traditional view of a cloud is turned upside down: in-
stead of having services or infrastructure offered by a single provider, the
same can be achieved by an aggregation of a multitude of mini providers.
Even though the contribution of an individual mini provider in an in-
verted cloud can be limited, the combination would nevertheless be sig-
nificant. We propose an architecture for an implementation of an inverted
cloud infrastructure to allow mini providers to offer processor time. Se-
curity and efficiency can be achieved by building upon Intel’s new SGX
technology.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing is a relatively young trend, having gained much traction in the
past few years. Businesses and individuals alike rely on cloud computing for a
variety of tasks. Cloud computing introduces a certain dynamicity to the way we
work with computers. For example, a company might want to ensure availability
of its systems during peak periods. One way of handling this situation consists of
simply leasing additional virtual servers whenever necessary. This both reduces
the total cost of ownership and allows us to deal with unexpected traffic surges
robustly.
While cloud computing offers the financial advantage of sharing hardware
costs among users, a significant investment is unfortunately still required from
cloud providers. Meanwhile, the devices used to access cloud services are them-
selves underutilized. Estimates of the average utilization of computer processors
vary between 5% and 15% [19].
This paper proposes a new approach, called the inverted cloud, which allows
these idle resources to be harvested. The traditional view of a cloud is turned
upside down: Instead of having services offered by a single provider, the same is
achieved by an aggregation of mini providers. Even though the contribution of
an individual mini provider in an inverted cloud can be limited, the combination
would nevertheless be significant. To concretize the idea, this paper works out
an architecture for an inverted cloud system to share processor time.
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Fig. 1. An overview of the inverted cloud architecture.
The next section investigates the requirements of the proposed architecture.
Section 3 works out the architecture in some detail, building upon Intel’s new
SGX technology to ensure security and efficiency. Section 4 discusses work related
to our proposal, and finally Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Overview and Requirements
In a standard cloud computing setting, clients send small requests to a cloud
provider where they are processed and their result returned. Due to page con-
straints we take a more abstract approach where clients provide work packages
that need to be executed. In Section 5 we discuss briefly how tasks could be split
in work packages. Note that work packages are not required to be completely
self-contained; They may still access other resources on the network.
In an inverted cloud setting the processing of these work packages is out-
sourced to mini providers. This reduces the task of a cloud provider to tracking
mini providers entering and leaving the network and balancing work loads. Fig-
ure 1 displays an overview of this architecture. Clients and mini providers are
only represented as two disjoint sets for clarity; There is no technical reason that
a client could not also be a mini provider.
In order to be useful, the system must comply with a number of require-
ments. The rest of this section gives an overview of the requirements that were
considered during the design of the communication and execution protocol.
Requirement 1: Secrecy of Computation Mini providers will execute work
packages on behalf of clients, but they should not be able to tell what is being
computed. The input data and the algorithm should be kept secret.
Requirement 2: Integrity of Computation Mini providers must attest that
the correct, unmodified work package was executed and produced the returned
result. Any manipulation of the result must be detectable by the cloud provider.
Requirement 3: Secure Execution The intermediate or output data must not
be leaked; The computation must take place in a protected environment and the
output should be protected.
Requirement 4: Performance The design of the system must allow for an
efficient implementation.
3 Architecture
In order to execute work packages in full isolation on the resources of a mini
provider, many attack vectors need to be addressed. We first introduce recent
advances in protected-module architectures and sandboxing that enable such
strong security guarantees, before discussing how these security primitives can
be combined in a novel way to build an inverted cloud.
3.1 Protected-Module Architectures
Providing strong isolation of code and data on commodity computing devices is
challenging. Operating systems have grown too complex to be able to guarantee
that no defects exist that could compromise this isolation.
Security measures have been proposed to significantly raise the bar for at-
tackers [5, 11, 18, 24, 27], but vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows [13, 25]) in
commodity applications and operating systems continue to be exploited on a
daily basis. Any system relying on such a huge trusted computing base (TCB)
cannot offer the security guarantees required to build a large inverted cloud.
Recent years many research projects have taken an alternative approach. In-
stead of relying on a huge TCB where the operating system provides all possible
required services to applications, protected-module architectures (PMAs) have
been proposed that provide only a minimal set of security primitives, which can
be implemented in hardware [7, 9, 12, 14, 23] or by a very limited-sized hyper-
visor [8, 22, 26]. The exact set of primitives offered depends on the proposed
security architecture, but all provide strong isolation of modules: modules are in
complete control of their own memory space. Any attempt to access their mem-
ory region by code executing outside the module at any privilege level (including
from other modules) will be blocked. Modules can only be accessed through an
interface that they expose explicitly. Hence, even when the system is infested
with malware, secrecy and integrity of protected modules remain guaranteed.3
Recent work by Agten et al. [1,2] and Patrignani et al. [16,17] proves that high-
level software properties can also be guaranteed at low-level by relying on PMA’s
memory protection and inserting proper checks at compile time.
PMAs avoid the snowball effect of ever-growing TCBs by using the oper-
ating system’s services, while not trusting them completely. Strackx et al. [22]
implement an example where an SSL-connection is set up between a protected
3 In practice modules may be manipulated before protection is enabled. Such attacks
are detected when the correct execution of modules is attested to a remote verifier
or when modules attempt to access previously stored secrets.
module and a remote server. By placing application and SSL logic within pro-
tected modules, only encrypted network packets cross the modules’ protection
boundaries. While the operating system’s services are still relied upon (e.g. for
network access), these services need not be trusted. Even though kernel-level
malware may modify, replay or drop network packets, confidentiality and in-
tegrity of data exchanged is guaranteed. This effectively reduces the power of an
in-kernel attacker to that of a network-level attacker.
In 2013, Intel announced Software Guard eXtensions (SGX), a PMA to be
implemented in their processors in the near future. Intel SGX provides even
stronger security guarantees than most state-of-the-art research architectures.
It not only protects modules (called “enclaves” in SGX terminology) against
software-level attacks, it also guards against hardware-level attacks by ensuring
that enclaves are stored unencrypted only within the processor package.
3.2 Isolating Enclaves
Protected-module architectures provide strong isolation of data stored. To enable
easy integration of protected modules in legacy software, PMAs such as Intel
SGX execute modules in the same address space as the rest of the application.
As a result, inputs to modules do not need to be marshalled but modules can
simply be provided with pointers to unprotected memory areas. Unfortunately,
this also enables malicious modules to extract data stored in the same address
space, or, even more worrysome, to attack the operating system.
Avonds et al. [4] and Strackx et al. [20] propose a mechanism to isolate
potential attack vectors in an application (e.g., parsers) from likely attack targets
(e.g., cryptographic keys). Using an approach similar to PMAs, they divide large
applications in multiple compartments where each compartment can only be
accessed through the interface they expose explicitly. Access to the operating
system is also heavily restricted: compartments can at initialization time indicate
which system calls will never be issued. Once a system call has been disabled
by a compartment, it can never be re-enabled. An application that is properly
compartmentalized will disable all system calls from likely attack vectors and an
attacker will need to compromise multiple compartments before reaching attack
targets.
For our inverted cloud infrastructure, we will use a similar sandboxing tech-
nique to protect mini providers from potentially malicious work packages. Before
execution, work packages are placed in a compartment without any system call
privileges. Only a very limited interface is provided to return execution results
to the cloud provider.
3.3 Executing Opaque Workloads
In order to guarantee correct and safe execution, our protocol operates in two
phases (see Figure 2). First, at initialization, a container enclave C is deployed on
the mini provider and a public-private key pair is generated. The mini provider
is now part of the inverted cloud and can receive work packages for execution. In
the second phase the private key is used by the cloud provider to send encrypted
work packages to the mini provider. These work packages will be passed to the
container enclave C where they are decrypted and executed in complete isolation.
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Fig. 2. The communication protocol to share work packages.
Phase 1: Initialization We assume that the mini provider supports the safe exe-
cution of potentially malicious work packages. Such support can be implemented
as a stand-alone application that provides compartmentalization, or it can be
integrated in an existing application such as a browser.
When the mini provider contacts the cloud provider (CP) to take part in
the inverted cloud, she is provided with a (signed) container C and a nonce n
(step 1 in Figure 2). After the signature of C has been verified, C is placed in
a compartment. Adhering to the principle of least privilege, the compartment
should only provide support to connect to the cloud provider. All system calls
should be disabled.
In step 2, container C is passed to a function in the compartment where
it is loaded in an enclave. Next, a private-public key pair is generated within
enclave C’s protection boundaries and sealed to its identity, ensuring that the
cryptographic keys can be used by future instances of C. The public key is
returned together with an attestation4 guaranteeing that C was executed cor-
rectly (step 3). The enclosed nonce n ensures freshness. After the cloud provider
verified the attestation (step 4) and determined that PKC was generated by a
correctly deployed and unmodified container C, the cryptographic key is stored.
Work packages send to the mini provider will always be encrypted using this
public key.
Phase 2: Putting Mini Providers to Work When a client sends a work pack-
age to the cloud provider, a mini provider is selected and the work package is
4 An attestation is a log of inputs and outputs signed by a trusted entity (e.g., the
mini provider’s platform). To avoid linkability of attestations, Intel SGX uses a more
privacy-friendly attestation scheme [3]. For clarity, we simply state what is attested.
encrypted with the mini provider’s public key.5 As this key is only accessible
from container C, attackers intercepting an encrypted work package WP in step
6 cannot decrypt it. A signature is also provided to guarantee that the work
package originates from the cloud provider.
In step 7, the mini provider checks the signature and decrypts the work
package. Care must be taken to erase the container’s private key before the
work package is executed. Failure to do so may leak the cryptographic key to an
attacker that uses the inverted cloud infrastructure to execute malicious work
packages. As all work packages sent to the mini provider are encrypted with the
same public key, possession of the decryption key would enable an attacker to
extract sensitive information from the work packages.
When the work package finished executing, its result is encrypted with the
cloud provider’s public key. This result is sent back to the client, together with
an attestation that the container executed correctly (step 8). The hash included
in the attestation log ensures that the mini provider executed the correct work
package and does not replay an old result.
The mini provider can now receive its next work package. However, enclave
container C needs to be destroyed and recreated to regain access to the sealed
SKC and PKC keys. Enabling access to the sealed cryptographic keys on disk
poses a security vulnerability as it may be exploited by a malicious work package.
An alternative solution would be to load work packages in their own enclave
in encrypted form. The decryption key could be passed in encrypted form to
container C that provides it to the enclave after its correct set up was verified
using local attestation [3]. Small bootcode at the beginning of the work package
would enable decryption of the rest of the package.
4 Related Work
Outsourcing work packages to other devices is not a new idea, but related work
can either not provide strong security guarantees or incurs significant overhead.
The SETI@Home project, for example, distributes work loads to analyze radio
signals in search for extraterrestrial life. To defend against malicious nodes re-
turning incorrect results, the same work load is send to two different nodes. Only
when both results match, the result is accepted. While effective, this approach
wastes computing power and cannot guarantee confidentiality of work loads.
Recently Miller et al. [10] proposed a modification to Bitcoin. While Bitcoin
clients are only required to execute otherwise useless computational workloads,
they propose Permacoin, a protocol where clients are also required to store large,
arbitrary volumes of data. As data can be easily confidential and integrity pro-
tected, clients can be used to store sensitive data. We propose a complementary
protocol enabling (potentially malicious) mini providers to operate on that data.
Parno et al. [15] take an alternative approach to “instill greater confidence
in computations outsourced to the cloud.” Instead of providing a safe execution
5 The client could encrypt the work package with the mini-provider’s key when the
cloud provider is not trusted, at the cost of increased communication overhead.
environment, they execute on encrypted data directly. A proof of correct exe-
cution is returned to the requester that requires less computing power than the
original computation. A similar approach could be used to invert the cloud, but
performance overhead to still too huge to be applied in practice.
The most related work was presented by Dunn et al. [6]. They propose the use
of TPM primitives to prevent the analysis of malware. While similar, their ap-
proach cannot defend against a powerful hardware attacker. Naturally, isolation
of potentially malicious work packages is also not in scope of their work.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
We have presented the concept of an inverted cloud. A major advantage of this
approach is that cloud providers do not have to invest in resources themselves,
but simply allocate resources of so-called mini providers to clients.
We have proposed an architecture for an inverted cloud service where clients
can buy processing time. We have shown that an implementation of this idea is
feasible when taking advantage of the new Intel SGX technology. The proposed
architecture takes into account a number of requirements that ensure the secrecy
and integrity of the computations.
In future work, we will implement and evaluate our proposed architecture.
This will give us more insight in the performance of mini providers and the
overhead induced by the network and communication protocol. We expect that
our approach can be easily applied to solve computationally intensive work loads
that can easily be split in short, parallel tasks. Applications that require long, se-
quential computation power may be harder to port to an inverted cloud setting,
especially when mini providers may unexpectedly disconnect from the cloud net-
work. For such work loads we look into two complementary research directions.
First, mini providers may return intermediate results in the form of new work
packages. Computation may then be continued by other mini providers. Second,
to reduce the impact of network packet overhead and quickly disconnecting mini
providers, we are looking at related work [21] to accompany work packages with
digital credits. Mini providers that successfully finish execution of work packages
or return intermediate results, are awarded a portion of the credits.
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